


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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September 11, 1983

Addendum to NSDD

On Lebanon of September 10, 1983

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It has been determined that occupation of the dominant terrain in the vicinity of SUQ-AL-GHARB by hostile forces will endanger Marine positions. Therefore, successful LAF defense of the area of SUQ-AL-GHARB is vital to the safety of US personnel (USMNF, other US military personnel in Beirut, and the US diplomatic presence). As a consequence, when the US ground commander determines that SUQ-AL-GHARB is in danger of falling as a result of attack involving non-Lebanese forces and if requested by the host government, appropriate US military assistance ~~to the LAF~~ in defense of SUQ-AL-GHARB is authorized. Assistance for this specific objective may include naval gun fire support and, if deemed necessary, tactical air strikes, but shall exclude ground forces.

I further direct that the Secretary of State immediately inform and consult with other MNF contributor governments and appropriate Congressional leadership on this directive.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Draft NSDD

Based on the discussion at the September 6, 1983, NSC meeting, the President decided that we must be prepared to take a range of military measures in support of our strategy for Lebanon. This led to the interagency preparation of the "Near-Term Lebanon Strategy" paper which we reviewed earlier today. In light of the analysis of the situation, the military options, and your comments, we have prepared a draft NSDD which I hope to forward to the President tomorrow afternoon. I would therefore appreciate your comments on this draft NSDD by 1600 EDT, September 8, 1983.

FOR THE PRESIDENT


William P. Clark

Attachment

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In keeping with the proposals discussed at the NSC Meeting September 6, 1983, and as detailed in the recommendations contained in the recent strategy paper for Lebanon, I am convinced of the need for immediate and forthright actions to (a) enhance our military posture, (b) improve the defensibility of the US contingent in the Multi-National Force, and (c) continue to demonstrate our support of the legitimate Government of Lebanon. Our objectives in Lebanon are unchanged: working toward a cessation of factional hostilities; strengthening the central government and facilitating the extension of its control; obtaining the total withdrawal of all foreign forces and securing Lebanese borders, especially the northern border with Israel.

The situation in Lebanon today is both critical and extremely fluid. The continuation of the present central government is problematic. It is by no means certain that US efforts to facilitate the process of reconciliation will bear fruit; it seems clear however that these efforts may very well founder if the Syrian Government continues to intervene directly and indirectly in the process of restoring order and broadening consensus. The role of the MNF and especially the US contingent is vital to our political and diplomatic efforts in support of the Government of Lebanon. The mission of our MNF contingent is to support the LAF and to deter hostilities by active presence in greater Beirut. Furthermore, US forces will adopt a posture of aggressive self-defense if attacked.

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Recent attacks on all the MNP contingents and more specifically the mounting casualties sustained by our Marines in Lebanon dictate a more active defense of these forces and other measures to enhance our deterrent posture vis-a-vis Syria and the Syrian surrogates responsible for recent attacks on our positions in Beirut. Because the threat to our forces and the vital mission they perform are not well understood by the American people, it is imperative that we undertake immediate efforts to better inform the Congress and the public of the vital interests at stake in Lebanon, the threats to those interests and the risks we face in defending them.

In furtherance of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) efforts to extend the authority and control of the central government, we need to review and expand the level of training and material assistance on a priority basis. The Secretary of Defense should submit recommendations to improve the near-term capabilities of the LAF and enhance its readiness for military operations which are already underway. In addition, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should review the level and quality of our tactical reconnaissance and intelligence support to the LAF and improve the extent and timeliness of that support where necessary and appropriate.

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The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should immediately review the rules of engagement governing defensive actions undertaken to protect the US and other MNF contingents in Lebanon with a view to responding with appropriate counteraction wherever this is feasible. In the event of direct attacks on our forces there should be an immediate and proportionate response at the source of provocation by whatever means are available and appropriate. Where a direct response is precluded by the collocation of the sources of hostile fire with civilian and noncombatants, a discrete but indirect response directed at other known hostile positions (e.g. those determined to be responsible for earlier hostile fire resulting in US or friendly casualties) is authorized. Finally, should hostile fire originating from the Syrian-controlled zone of Lebanon result in US fatalities, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS will recommend to me appropriate Syrian military targets in Lebanon for demonstrative air strikes. Upon submission of such a recommendation, U.S. Forces should attain a high degree of readiness for immediate execution of such strikes.

Our supporting naval posture in the vicinity of the MNF area of operations in Lebanon must be reinforced both to increase our immediate readiness to defend our forces on the ground and to enhance the deterrent against forcible Syrian (or Syrian-controlled) actions against the MNF. The impending arrival of the Pacific Fleet Marine Amphibious Ready Group should improve our posture in this regard. Beyond this initial measure, I have

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become convinced that our sea-control and naval power-projection posture in the Mediterranean may require enhancement.

To this end, the Secretary of Defense should now order naval movements which would facilitate the augmentation of the United States Sixth Fleet with an additional Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) within two weeks. Moreover, plans and preparations should be taken for possible deployment of the USS NEW JERSEY to the Mediterranean. While this decision does not necessarily commit naval forces to operations in support of our forces ashore in Lebanon, it will materially add to our capabilities if it is determined that the situation in Lebanon so warrants. Beyond these measures, the Department of Defense and the Department of State should continue urgent consultations with the other MNF contributors to coordinate and cooperate in the supporting naval operations.

In the event the above measures prove insufficient or inadequate or if the situation in Lebanon continues to worsen, we need an urgent interagency assessment of the following additional measures to be reviewed and considered by the NSPG.

- The implications of--and the conditions which might require--more direct action against Syrian military formations in Lebanon and Syria proper.
- Conditions which might warrant an expansion of the MNF mandate and mission to include actions in direct support of Lebanese Armed Forces defense of the greater Beirut area and/or extension of the MNF area of operations beyond Beirut.

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Draft 9/6/83

Near-Term Lebanon Strategy

We have reached a critical juncture in our Lebanon policy. The prospects for further casualties among U.S. Marines, and other MNF contributors, the evident weakness of the GOL and the restricted operational area of the LAF, the GOL's difficulties in forming a government of national union, and the Israeli pullback have combined to force immediate decisions with far-reaching consequences affecting our presence in Lebanon and our future role both in the Middle East and throughout the globe. In considering the options for immediate action we must keep in mind the four objectives which now govern our presence: move to a cessation of hostilities; strengthen the central government to make possible eventual control throughout Lebanon; departure of foreign forces from Lebanon; and securing of the Northern border of Israel.

U.S. credibility is also at a critical point. Can we use our military power to help a friendly but weak government in a manner which would not jeopardize our larger interests in the Middle East? The answer turns not only on military effectiveness, but on the broad acceptability of our political goals for Lebanon, to the Lebanese, our Allies, and moderate Arab friends as well.

To achieve these objectives we must decide whether to conduct expanded operations within the limits we have defined for ourselves thus far, and whether we should undertake broader, more militarily and politically significant actions which would cross a threshold and require a major new commitment of U.S. force and prestige beyond what is now committed.

Two Basic Approaches

Within the near term we should consider two basic concepts to support U.S. policy in Lebanon. The first would involve a continuation of the present mandate with increased assistance and support for the GOL and LAF as the legitimate authority in Lebanon. It would envisage more aggressive defense of U.S. marine forces and the MNF as well as the expansion of the MNF offshore to bolster our deterrent posture in the region.

The second concept would involve a major change in the mandate for U.S. forces possibly culminating in combat activities in support of the GOL defense of Beirut. This

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approach would continue the steps undertaken in the first concept but would go significantly further. Support by the Congress, our MNF allies and key Middle East governments would be imperative.

I. Option A: Active Protection of the MNF within the Limits We have Defined for Ourselves

A. Strengthen GOL Forces:

1. Continued resupply of LAF: This would finish out the effort which we have already begun through Egypt;
2. Accelerated training of new LAF units to increase the size and capabilities of the LAF.
3. Increased supply to the LAF of weapons to deal with the current threat to the MNF, including long range artillery and armor.
4. Provision of tactical intelligence to the LAF in real time.
5. Tactical reconnaissance support by carrier aircraft and other U.S. assets minimizing risks.
6. Armed reconnaissance in support of MNF permitting U.S. aircraft to counter hostile fire.
7. Direct artillery support for LAF operations initiated in retaliation for fire at MNF positions.

B. More Active Defense of MNF and Marines:

1. Provide additional and more effective target locating equipment.
2. Discrete but responsive artillery air and naval actions to silence hostile fire.
3. Mount armed reconnaissance of Syrian controlled zone in Lebanon.
4. Consider retaliatory action against Syrian positions in Lebanon.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

C. Expansion of MNF at Sea:

1. Skillfully coordinate with the French and British after the arrival of the Carrier Foch (September 7) and the HMS Invincible (September 22) to maximize the air strike and naval gunfire capability to deter hostile action against the MNF.
2. Convince Italian Navy to play a more substantial role in support of ground forces.
3. Movement of another U.S. carrier battle group to Mediterranean.
4. Send New Jersey from Western Central America through Panama Canal to Lebanon.

II. Option B. Active Protection of the GOL in City of Beirut

This is a logical extension of the above activities pushing the LAF as a priority. The sequence of steps needed in this approach would involve a continuation of the military measures plus the following:

A. First skillfully build maximum bi-partisan Congressional support. In moving forward on an increased U.S. commitment in Lebanon clearly some action with the Hill on the War Powers notification would be necessary. In any case, before proceeding further with this option as a first step we should measure our support in the Congress.

B. Resuming MNF patrols in the city of Beirut would release LAF assets for operations in the Shuf and on the coastal road.

III. Building Allied Support and GOL Base

A. If we are to have success in our actions we must continue to ensure the support of our partners in the MNF. We should undertake a complementary consultative effort with our allies in Europe. The Secretary of State would reinforce these efforts while in Madrid.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 4 -

B. We should work to keep the governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt engage in supporting our efforts. Moderate Arab support is a key ingredient both in isolating Syria and in gluing together a new Lebanese consensus.

C. We should continue efforts to maintain and strengthen the central government, concentrated in the short term on efforts to achieve a political agreement which includes a ceasefire, movement of the LAF into the Shuf and initiation of a process to broaden the base of the GOL.

D. In the longer term, we should continue to strive for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, including the Syrians. At the same time, while a broadened government would want to review the Agreement with Israel and freeze implementation, we would make clear that we do not support abrogation since it is an instrument through which Israel's eventual withdrawal can be achieved.

IV. Other Activities to Study Urgently

A. Implications of more direct action against Syria.

B. Whether to defend a perimeter beyond Beirut targets in Lebanon.

C. Trends and realistic possibilities over the next few months.

D. The longer-term problem in the broad global context of the next two years. Where we, Israel, Arab friends, Europeans, Soviets, etc., are going.

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NEAR TERM LEBANON STRATEGY

I. Two Concepts

Option A. Active Protection of Marines and the MNF

(1) Strengthen GOL forces to defend area under GOL control.

-- intensify training and equipment in long-range artillery, commando operations, helo strike forces, logistics, etc., for core of LAF in Beirut area.

(2) More active cover and support for MNF contingents.

-- additional counter-battery radar, target locators, and all source intelligence, strengthening airport defenses, discrete but responsive ground artillery and naval bombardment (e.g. shoot back until silenced), helo gun ships; tactical air reconnaissance; and discrete use of tactical air.

-- consider armed reconnaissance of Syrian controlled zone in Lebanon.

-- consider retaliatory action against Syrian positions in Lebanon.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

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- (3) MNF expansion at sea coupled with existing U.S. amphibious group augmentation (arriving 12 September).

- Naval coordination with French Carrier force there.
- Expand Italian Naval role off Lebanon.
- British Harrier helo carrier force remains off rather than moving to Indian Ocean (22 September).*

- (4) Movement of another U.S. carrier battle group to Eastern Mediterranean.

- (5) Movement of New Jersey from Pacific Coast off El Salvador through Panama Canal to Lebanon.

Option B. Active Protection of the GOL in City of Beirut

- (1) Logical extension of above activities, pushing LAF as priority but ultimately willing to use U.S. combat power to defend Beirut.

II. Logical Sequence

A. Consultation

- (1) First skillfully build maximum bipartisan Congressional support.

- Resolution/War Powers
- Selected actions we may take in more active defense of MNF under concept chosen.

*Persian Gulf gap with US (and allied) assets. including option of land-based reinforcement in Oman, Saudi Arabia, etc. to meet threat of escalating Iran-Iraq war.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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- 3 -

(2) Build allied support with emphasis on MNF contributors.

-- e.g., Shultz Madrid meeting, Presidential letters, etc.

(3) Concert with Middle East supporters.

B. Military Activities

(1) Steps fall into logical sequence starting with LAF.

III. Other Activities to Study Urgently

- A. Trends and realistic possibilities over next few months.
- B. The longer-term problem in the broad global context of the next two years. Where we, Israel, Arab friends, Europeans, Soviets, etc., are going.
- C. Implications of more direct action against Syrian targets in Lebanon.
- D. Whether to defend a perimeter beyond Beirut.

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DRAFT--9/7/83

BROAD ACTIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS

Following yesterday's NSC discussion of Lebanon, a strategy for near-term actions in support of our fundamental objectives for Lebanon has been developed. There are four major recommendations for Presidential decision:

1. Enlist the support of the American people, including close Congressional consultations, as we consider additional military activities in Lebanon. (White House).

2. Undertake consultations with key allies to provide the level of support consistent with expanded MNF activity (State).

3. In the context of our near-term strategy, develop measures that will optimize the contributions of the LAF, US forces, and other MNF contingents in support of US objectives (DOD).

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